deriveGroupKey
deriveGroupKey(
signer,ref,options?):Promise<DerivedGroupKey>
Defined in: derive.ts:204
Sign for one group key and derive its key.
The signature is the root secret, and it never leaves this function: the caller gets the group key and the public commitment, and has nothing else to guard.
For a new group key this signs twice and compares, which catches a
non-deterministic signer before any data depends on it, at the cost of a second
wallet prompt. For an existing one, pass the commitment its dataset records
(foc/kc): it signs once, and the commitment catches the same faults. See
DeriveGroupKeyOptions.
With options.password, the key also depends on that password, so a
phished signature alone no longer yields it. Lose the password and the
group key is lost: nothing else can recover it. Only a recorded commitment
can tell a wrong password from a right one, so reopen a protected group key
with both password and commitment, and have the user confirm the
password when creating one: a typo there silently roots the group key under
the typo.
Only the owner’s own wallet can sign: a key signed by any other wallet, a session key included, is not the key the owner’s wallet derives, and nothing downstream could tell. Delegates receive a grant instead.
The result carries the group key descriptor, so an owner writes the same way
a delegate does — writeTarget(descriptor, groupKey, group) — with the group key
taken from what was actually signed.
Parameters
Section titled “Parameters”| Parameter | Type |
|---|---|
signer |
TypedDataSigner |
ref |
GroupKeyRef |
options? |
DeriveGroupKeyOptions |
Returns
Section titled “Returns”Throws
Section titled “Throws”Before any signing, if options.password is empty or not well-formed
Unicode, or options.commitment is not a commitment in format v2. After signing,
if the signer is not deterministic, is not the owner, does not produce an ECDSA
signature, or derives a key that does not match options.commitment (with a
password, most often a wrong password).